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A fast evolving debate on budgetary policy in EMU
This Communication dedicated to Public finances in EMU reviews Member States’ budgetary
performance in 2000 and assesses the short and medium-term prospects.1 It also contains an in-
depth examination of some of the most important questions in the fast evolving debate on
budgetary policy at EU level. This debate is being shaped by several factors, not least a growing
understanding of the challenges and constraints facing Member States in running budgetary
policies in EMU. Four issues dominate the discussions on EU budgetary policy as follows:
• the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) target of budget positions that are “close to balance or
in surplus”, an important goal not yet reached in several Member States: having achieved
impressive budgetary consolidation in the run up to EMU, Member States committed
themselves in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) to reach the SGP target of
budget positions that are “close to balance or in surplus”, as a rule, by the end of 2001.
Respect of the SGP target is vital for the smooth functioning of EMU as it would safeguard the
3% of GDP deficit ceiling and allow the automatic stabilisers to operate fully in the event of
an economic slowdown. With a deterioration in budget balances projected this year and
mounting downside economic risks, attaining the SGP target remains an important budgetary
goal for the countries that continue to have sizeable structural deficits.
• the importance of budgetary policy delivering an appropriate policy mix both at the euro area
and Member State level: EMU is a unique policy framework in having a centralised monetary
policy but decentralised budgetary policies. Member States’ budgetary policy must therefore
ensure an appropriate policy mix at national level, while at the same time contributing to an
appropriate fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole. There is a growing awareness of the
need to satisfy both of these objectives. The importance of Member States’ budgetary policy in
delivering the right policy mix at national level was evident several months ago when there
were clear signs of overheating in several euro area Member States. In addition, a balanced
policy mix at the aggregate euro level (where fiscal policies should not overburden monetary
policy) is being increasingly recognised as a necessary step to tackle successfully the current
economic slowdown.
• broadening the debate on budgetary policy to include the quality and sustainability of public
finances: new priorities are coming to the fore now that most Member States have reduced
1 This Communication is based on analysis contained in the report “Public finances in EMU – 2001” of the
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. European Economy Reports N°3, 2001
3their budgetary imbalances. The debate on budgetary policy at EU level needs to expand from
its current focus on discipline towards a parallel emphasis on the contribution of public
finances to growth and employment. The challenge facing Member States is now to sustain
sound public budget positions while at the same time lowering the tax burden, restructuring
public expenditure to support a knowledge-based economy and preparing for the budgetary
consequences of ageing populations. Sustainable public finances also contribute to the overall
strategy for sustainable development endorsed by the European Council of Gothenburg in June
2001. Budgetary surveillance at EU level needs to evolve if it is to support Member States in
pursuing ambitious reform agendas that do not jeopardise the commitment to fiscal discipline.
• better co-ordination on budgetary questions is needed: recent events have highlighted
inadequate co-ordination on budgetary questions in EMU, and consequently a failure on the
part of Member States to react in a timely and consistent manner to common economic
shocks/challenges. Examples of such co-ordination include how to respond to pressure to
lower fuel taxes in the face of rising oil prices, what to do with windfall revenues from the sale
of third generation (UMTS) mobile phone licenses, how to bring about a sustainable reduction
in the tax burden, and what is the appropriate role of budgetary polices in containing
overheating pressures. Faced with economic shocks/challenges of a similar nature, it is
reasonable to expect that countries in a monetary union would react with policies that are
consistent and which take on board the euro area implications, although the individual policy
responses obviously need to be tailored to reflect country-specific circumstances. Even in
cases when the policies adopted by Member States have been broadly consistent with the EU
fiscal framework, lack of co-ordination has led to the impression that countries are unwilling
to acknowledge the euro area implications of national policy actions, and that co-ordination
only takes place after the event. Tackling the apparent shortcomings in the co-ordination of
budgetary policies is a necessary and urgent task.
Budgetary developments and prospects
Recent budgetary policy developments and prospects present a mixed picture. On the one hand,
the budget deficit of the euro area has continued to shrink to 0.7% of GDP in 2000 (net of UMTS
revenues), a drop of 0.5% of GDP compared with 1999, and at the same time the tax burden is
being lowered in most countries. Moreover, most of the one-off budgetary receipts from the sale
of UMTS licences have, as agreed, been used to reduce debt.
On the other hand, four euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy and Portugal) are projected to
have sizeable deficits in 2001. These countries have missed the opportunity of the recent
favourable growth environment to meet the target of the Stability and Growth Pact, and thus they
have less room for manoeuvre in the face of the current slowdown. In general, the budgetary
outcome for 2000 should have been better, as some governments gave away part of the higher-
than-expected “growth dividend” via tax cuts or expenditure increases. Moreover, both the actual
and cyclically-adjusted budget balances of the euro are set to deteriorate slightly in 2001,
marking the first reversal in budgetary consolidation since 1993. While this is largely due to
welcome reductions in the tax burden, accompanying expenditure reforms have been postponed
or toned down in some countries, including measures to modernise pension systems.
The downside risks are mounting with signs of decelerating growth in most countries. In this
context, automatic budgetary stabilisers should be allowed to operate fully in those countries that
have already achieved budget positions which respect the SGP target of “close to balance or in
surplus”. In contrast, the full use of automatic stabilisers may not be feasible in those Member
4States that have yet to reach the SGP target, as this could lead to deficits that approach the 3% of
GDP deficit ceiling.
The aggregate policy mix for the euro area has been broadly balanced in 2000 and 2001. In
contrast, the policy mix at national level has not always been appropriate, as fiscal behaviour in
some countries has been inconsistent with domestic cyclical and monetary conditions. In the
short-term, maintaining a sound policy mix at the euro area level is essential to limit the adverse
consequences of the current deceleration in growth: an undue loosening of the fiscal stance could
overburden monetary policy, leading to higher-than-necessary interest rates. A particular effort is
also required in those Member States experiencing signs of overheating to ensure that the fiscal
stance at national level reflects the particular cyclical and monetary conditions they face.
As regards medium-term prospects, the updated stability and convergence programmes provide
for a broadly neutral fiscal stance while allowing for a steady reduction in the tax burden. They
also show that all Member States aim to reach the SGP target of close to balance or in surplus,
but in several cases only in 2003 or 2004. This indicates that budgetary consolidation is being
back-loaded towards the final years of the programmes of some countries. It is important that the
SGP goal is attained in accordance with the commitments in the BEPGs, so that it does not
become a goal that is continuously deferred into the future. Although some Member States have
set medium-term targets that go beyond the “close to balance or in surplus” SGP target, the
programmes of most Member States appear to be unambitious in light of other budgetary
objectives, and especially the need to prepare for the budgetary consequences of ageing
populations.
Budgetary surveillance and institutions
A sound budgetary performance requires effective institutions, that is efficient decision-making
procedures, targets and behavioural rules. It is therefore necessary to look at how the budgetary
institutions at both EU and national level are adapting to the new framework for conducting
national fiscal policies in a monetary union.
A key question in the framework of budgetary surveillance in EMU is what are the appropriate
medium-term targets to respect the SGP goal of close to balances or in surplus. When EMU was
launched, the first step was to ensure that Member States’ budgetary positions would create a
sufficient safety margin so that the automatic stabilisers could operate in cyclical downturns
without endangering the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling. Now that such a cyclical safety-margin has
been created in most Member States, it is time to complete the transition to the SGP target of
budget positions which are “close to balance or in surplus”: this would build in an additional
safety margin for other budgetary risks (such as unexpected shortfalls in tax revenues,
expenditure overruns or interest rate shocks), and provide for a rapid reduction in the stock of
public debt in high-debt countries towards the 60% of GDP reference value.
A broadly balanced budget in structural terms would be required for most countries to respect the
SGP goal as it would cater for budgetary risks related to cyclical downturns as well as unexpected
budgetary developments. Adherence to this goal is particularly important for high debt countries
(Belgium, Greece and Italy) to ensure that debt levels fall rapidly to the 60% of GDP threshold.
However, for countries which have large automatic stabilisers (the Netherlands, Finland and,
outside the euro area, Denmark and Sweden), a small structural surplus of some 1% of GDP
appears adequate. Overall, these suggested targets are consistent with budgetary projections
outlined by Member States in their updated stability and convergence programmes.
5In a recent Communication on enhancing policy co-ordination in the euro area,2 the Commission
outlined some practical suggestions on how to improve the EU budgetary surveillance within the
existing legislative framework. Four suggestions warrant consideration, namely: (a) to establish a
principle whereby Member States pre-inform the Commission and Council of major budgetary
decisions before they are finally adopted/decided; (b) to cluster the submission of stability and
convergence programmes in autumn of each year; (c) to improve the information content of the
programmes; and (d) to extend their coverage to include the long-term sustainability of public
finances.
National budgetary rules and procedures contribute towards meeting budgetary objectives at EU
level. Member States’ budgetary institutions are clearly being influenced by the need to be
consistent with EU surveillance in a number of ways. A key factor is that the SGP establishes
budgetary targets and commitments in the medium-term (3 to 4 years) compared with the
traditional focus on an annual budget cycle at national level. Partly in response to the SGP,
several Member States now use a multi-year budgeting framework or other
mechanisms/guidelines to set and control public expenditure priorities in the medium-term.
EU commitments are also shaping the relationships between the different budgetary actors at
national level, i.e. central government, national parliaments and State/local authorities. Several
Member States have put arrangements in place to strengthen the responsibility for each level of
government in meeting the target of the general government balance set down in the stability or
convergence programmes. A welcome development is the so-called “internal stability pacts”
which have been agreed in several Member States.
Budgetary policy and cyclical stabilisation in EMU
Budgetary policy and cyclical stabilisation i(and in particular the functioning of the automatic
fiscal stabilisers) are central questions in the debate on fiscal policy in EMU. Analysis on these
issues is important as it could serve as a basis for developing guidelines on the appropriate policy
response expected from a Member State in EMU when faced with various types of economic
shocks, i.e. providing a common analytical framework which could help avoid past co-ordination
failures.
Given the loss of national monetary policy in EMU, budgetary policy needs to play a more
significant role in smoothing the impact of country-specific shocks on real output. To this end,
the norm for budgetary behaviour should be to let automatic stabilisers operate freely in both
upturns and downturns, with discretionary policy being the exception rather than the rule. While
this conclusion is quite uncontroversial, a number of open questions remain. Are automatic
stabilisers always beneficial for the economy? How much cyclical smoothing can be expected
from the working of automatic stabilisers? What kind of reforms could improve the effectiveness
of automatic stabilisers?
The answers largely depend on whether the shocks hitting the economy emanate from the
demand or supply side, although this distinction is not always clear-cut in practice. In the event
of demand shocks, such as an acceleration of private consumption or a fall in exports, the output
gap and inflation move in the same direction. Automatic fiscal stabilisers can therefore play a
useful role as they cushion the impact both on output and prices. Empirical evidence shows that
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6automatic stabilisers are particularly effective in smoothing shocks to private consumption, but
less so in the event of shocks to investment or external demand.
In contrast, supply shocks (such as changes in energy prices or technological innovation)
typically send output and inflation in opposite directions: for instance, a rise in the oil price
results in a negative output gap and higher inflation. In this case, automatic stabilisers help
smooth output, but at the cost of even higher inflation. Moreover, if the shock is permanent (i.e. it
affects the level of potential activity), automatic stabilisers may be unhelpful if they delay the
necessary adjustment towards the “new” level of potential output: instead what is needed is
public finances conducive to flexibility in product and factor markets to enable output to
converge to its new equilibrium level. In practice, the empirical evidence points to a relatively
small impact of the automatic stabilisers in the case of supply shocks: they are thus unlikely to act
as a major brake on the required adjustment or make it more difficult for the ECB to maintain
price stability.
Improving the quality and sustainability of public finances
The Stockholm European Council of March 2001, recognised the need to broaden the debate on
budgetary policy at EU level from its current focus on budgetary stability towards a parallel
emphasis on the contribution of public finances to growth and employment. In particular, it called
for the quality and sustainability of public finances to be improved.
As outlined in the Joint Commission-Council report to the Stockholm European Council in
March 2001,3 the “quality” of public finances can contribute to economic growth and
employment in many different ways. Public spending (e.g. in physical and human capital
investment, research and innovation, education, social and regional transfers) can enhance
employment and output potential. However, a lack of consistent and updated data, especially on
the functional distribution of public spending, has so far hampered a thorough and overall
analysis of these issues which need to be addressed in future reports in liaison with the
benchmarking exercises of the relevant policies (e.g. education, research and innovation). A
strong engagement on the part of Member States is important to remedy such statistical
deficiencies
Taxation systems can also contribute to employment and growth by seeking a balanced burden-
sharing across taxable sources, facilitating entrepreneurship and providing the right incentives
for economic agents to work, save and invest. Efficient tax systems can also facilitate structural
change in the event of permanent shocks, and can also encourage workers to stay longer in the
labour force, thereby helping meet the challenges of ageing societies.
Some progress has been made in easing the fiscal burden on labour and reducing marginal tax
rates. In several Member States, this has been done in the context of environmental tax reforms,
where reductions in the fiscal burden on labour have been financed by new or increased taxes on
pollution or resource use, which lead to the inclusion of external environmental costs in market
prices. Results, however, have so far been mixed and further effort is needed since overall labour
3 Council of the European Union (2001), “The Contribution of Public Finances to Growth and Employment:
Improving Quality and Sustainability”, Report of the Commission and the (ECOFIN) Council to the
European Council (Stockholm 23/24 March 2001), 6997/01.
7taxation remains very high by historical and international standards in some Member States. A
particular effort is also needed to reduce the tax burden on low paid labour. Progress in the field
of environmental taxes has been very modest to date, and this issue could be addressed in future
reports.
As to benefit systems, modest progress has been made in recent years and there is still some way
to go to render them more employment friendly. Recent measures have strengthened the
conditionality of unemployment and social benefit schemes by revising eligibility criteria,
reinforcing checks that conditionality requirements for benefits receipt are met, and improving
overall management and enforcement. However, a comprehensive approach that takes the
interaction between tax and benefit systems into account has often been lacking. Also the shift
from passive towards active policies has been relatively limited. Without further reforms, it will
be difficult for the EU to meet the ambitious employment targets established by the Lisbon and
Stockholm European Councils.
The long term sustainability of public finances is of added significance in EMU. Ageing will lead
to substantial falls in the size of the labour force, a doubling of the old-age dependency ratio by
2050 and a consequent sharp drop in the ratio of employed persons to inactive persons. Recent
projections of the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) show that spending on public pensions
could increase by between 3% and 5% of GDP in most Member States in coming decades, with
very large increases projected in some countries (especially Spain, Greece and Portugal, all of
whom finance public pensions on a PAYG basis). If account is taken of health and care for the
elderly, the overall impact of ageing on public spending could amount to an average increase of
between 5% and 8% of GDP.
This raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of public finances: failure to prepare for
the budgetary costs of ageing could make it difficult for Member States to respect the SGP and
could complicate the implementation of the single monetary policy by the ECB. Sustainable
public finances, however, not only entail avoiding structural deficits and rising debt (i.e. respect
of the SGP targets), but also keeping the tax burden at reasonable levels so that employment and
growth are not hindered, and ensuring that essential non-age related public expenditures (such as
education and investment) are not crowded-out by pressures for increased spending on pensions
and health care.
The joint Commission-Council report to the European Council in Stockholm outlined a three-
pronged strategy to address the budgetary consequences of ageing populations, namely a suitable
combination of : (1) running down public debt at a faster pace; (2) measures to raise employment
rates (especially amongst women and older workers); and (3) reforming pension systems to place
them on a sound financial footing including greater recourse to the funding of public pensions.
The overall sustainability of public finances also depends on progress being made to implement
structural reforms in product, services and capital markets.
The Stockholm European Council called for the long-term sustainability of public finances to be
factored into the SGP and the BEPGs.
Although the budgetary impact of ageing populations only becomes evident in the long-run, it is
determined by short to medium-term policy decisions taken within the time frame of the stability
and convergence programmes. An appropriate balance has to be drawn between cutting taxes and
running down public debt, and implies that priority should be given to the latter in high debt
countries. Current policy choices (such as the medium-term budgetary target, the pace of debt
reduction and the scale and type of tax reforms) outlined in the programmes therefore need to be
8assessed against the commitment to place public finances on a sustainable footing. To conduct
regular assessments of these nature at EU level, further work is needed in developing comparable
data and indicators. Projections on the impact of ageing on public finances, along the lines of the
work underway in the EPC, could be usefully updated on a regular basis, say every two or three
years, and incorporated in the updates of the stability and convergence programmes.
*
* *
The way ahead: strengthening co-ordination in budgetary issues
For the decentralised (bottom-up) approach to budgetary policy to work, there must be real
substance to economic policy coordination with a realistic account taken of the euro area
dimension of national policy actions. Markets and the general public are not looking for a central
fiscal authority in EMU, but instead for a tangible demonstration of the capacity to achieve a
consistent budgetary policy at the euro area and national level, and a willingness on the part of
euro area countries to respect agreed rules and budgetary goals. Effective policy co-ordination
requires that a common and transparent analytical framework exists for analysing economic
policy challenges and for devising policy responses and that adequate and timely account is taken
of the implications for the euro area of national policies. Further efforts are needed to improve
co-operation on budgetary policy in EMU along these lines.
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